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out the occurrence of a similar accident. 10 There was no evidence of
negligence in the construction of the theatre in an action by a patron
to recover for personal injuries suffered when, having slipped or stumbled, he fell from the gallery, the floor of which inclined about fiftyfive degrees, over the parapet, which, with the balustrade, was over
three feet high and that in the many years that the theatre was used
no such accident had ever taken place."
For the application of the rule, an analysis of the cases reveals,
it is essential that the structure, machine or appliance had been
(1) safely used in the past and that the use was (2) continuous
(3) for a long period of time.' 2 However, the latter prerequisite
one, it is satisfied even though
may vary in each case. In a proper
3
the use is only for several days.'
A.G.

WILLs-FUTURE INTERESTS-VESTING oF" ESTATES.-Testator

died leaving a will providing for a trust.fund of his residuary estate,
the income of which was to be payable to his. widow for life: Upon
the death of his widow, the trust was to terminate and the trustees
were to sell and dispose of the corpus. Frofi'the proceeds, two legacies of $1,000 each were to be paid to his grandfhildren, and the remainder was to be divided equally among his three sons, Harry,
Robert and John, or thei survivors. In the event that either grandchild should die before him, the amount of his legacy was to go-to his
issue, if any, otherwise it was to lapse and was to be added to the
portion to be received by the sons. One of the sons, Harry, survived
the testator, but predeceased the widow. The surrogate excluded his
estate from participation in the proceeds of the trust fund. On appeal, held, two judges dissenting, reversed. The requirements of sur-,
vivorship of the remainderman imposed by the testator 'referred to'
the death of the testator, and not to the death of the life tenant. In re
Montgomery Estate, 258 App. Div. 64, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 729 (2nd
Dept. 1939).
It is a cardinal rule of construction that the law favors the vest10 Loftus v. Union Ferry Co., 84 N. Y. 455 (1881).
In another action to recover for the fatal injuries sustained by the plaintiff's intestate, which could have been avoided if the elevator in which she. was a
passenger had been more adequately enclosed, it was held that the defendant
was not negligent, for no evidence was offered that any similar accident had
happened before and there was proof that elevators similarly constructed had
been safely used for years. McGrell v. Office Building Co., 153 N. Y. 265,

47 N. E. 305 (1897).
11 Dunning v. Jacobs, 15 Misc. 85, 36 N. Y. Supp. 453 (1895).
12 See note 9, miupra.
13 O'Connor v. Webber, 239 N. Y. 191, 146 N. E. 200 (1924).
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ing of estates. 1 The rule has been stated that "a remainder is not to
be considered as contingent in any case where consistently with the
intention of the testator it may be construed as being vested." 2 The
most frequent situation wherein this rule is applied is in those cases
where the remainderman of an estate dies prior to the time prescribed
by the testator for the actual possession and enjoyment of the estate.3
In such case it must be determined whether the testator intended that
survivorship of the remainderman up to the time of the enjoyment of
his estate was a condition precedent to the vesting in him of the
estate,4 or, whether the estate vested immediately upon the remainderman surviving the testator, though the enjoyment of the estate was
postponed. 5 In this connection it has been held that as a general rule,
the requirement of survivorship of a remainderman imposed by the
IIn re Evans Estate, 165 Misc. 752, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 99 (1937) ("No rule
is more frequently referred to than that the law favors the vesting of estates").
This rule has been actuated by a desire "to avoid perpetuities, intestacy, illegal
suspension of the power of alienation, and to effect an intent which might otherwise be defeated." Dougherty v. Thompson, 167 N. Y. 472, 483, 60 N. E. 760,
763 (1901). See also Miller v. Von Schwarzenstein, 51 App. Div. 18, 64
N. Y. Supp. 475 (4th Dept. 1900); Vanderpoel v. Burke, 63 Misc. 545, 118
N. Y. Supp. 548 (1909); Chandler v. Kron, 110 Misc. 397, 180 N. Y. Supp. 198
(1920); Matter of Leonard, 143 Misc. 172, 256 N. Y. Supp. 355 (1932) ; Matter
of Soy, 143 Misc. 217, 256 N. Y. Supp. 545 (1932) ; In re Kelly's Estate, 167
Misc. 751, 4 N. Y. S. (26) 675 (1938).
2 Hersee v. Simpson, 154 N. Y. 496, 500, 48 N. E. 890, 891 (1897).
Accord: Embury v. Sheldon, 68 N. Y. 227 (1877); Moore v. Lyons, 25 Wend.
119 (N. Y. 1840); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Hun 352 (N. Y. 1874); Cogan v.
McCabe, 23 Misc. 739, 52 N. Y. Supp. 48 (1898) ; In re Cipolla, 165 Misc. 498,
1 N. Y. S. (2d) 8 (1938).
3 See Matter of Lockwood, 192 App. Div. 850, 183 N. Y. Supp. 103 (3d
Dept. 1920); Clow v. Schlieman, 166 N. Y. Supp. 472 (1917); Matter of
Clarke, 120 Misc. 191, 197 N. Y. Supp. 824 (1923) ; It re Werner's Estate, 167
Misc. 92, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 965 (1938).
4 Hall v. La France Fire Engine Co., 158 N. Y. 570, 53 N. E. 513 (1899),
afrg, 8 App. Div. 616, 40 N. Y. Supp. 1143 (4th Dept. 1896) (a conveyance to
one to have and to hold for and during her natural life, and at her death to the
heirs of her body her surviving, created a contingent remainder); Shangle v.
Hallock, 6 App. Div. 55, 39 N. Y. Supp. 619 (2d Dept. 1896); May v. May,
209 App. Div. 19, 204 N. Y. Supp. 411 (2d Dept. 1924) ; Hunt v. TuIler, 244
App. Div. 363, 279 N. Y. Supp. 468 (1st Dept. 1935) ; Matter of Bristol, 147
Misc. 578, 264 N. Y. Supp. 349 (1933) (testator directed the division of the
principal of a trust fund among his grandchildren or their issue, and two nieces
and a nephew, or such of them as shall survive his daughter. Held, gift created
a contingent estate, vesting being conditioned upon survivorship of the daughter) ; In re Barnes' Estate, 155 Misc. 320, 279 N. Y. Supp. 177 (1935).
5 Mere postponement of the enjoyment of the portion of the residue of
testator's estate devised to three sisters, by the creation of a life estate in such
portion in testator's widow, did not prevent the vesting thereof in the three
sisters upon testator's death. In re Weaver's Estate, 253 App. Div. 24, 1 N. Y.
S. (2d) 167 (3d Dept. 1937), aff'd, 278 N. Y. 605, 16 N. E. (2d) 121 (1938).
Postponement of the time of payment will not of itself make a legacy contingent unless it be annexed to the substance of the gift, or unless it be upon an
event of such nature that testator presumably meant to make no gift unless that
event happened. In re Greenslitt's Will, 165 Misc. 464, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1099
(1938). See note 1, supra.
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testator refers to the death of the testator, and not to the death of the
life tenant. 6 If the remainderman dies before the life tenant, the es-7
tate will nevertheless vest in him provided he survives the testator.
In many cases this result is confirmed by the application of other
doctrines of construction, such as: the law favors testacy and not
intestacy; 8 the designation of the remainderman by name is a strong
indication of the intent of the testator that the remainder should vest
on his death; 9 the use of words of present gift in reference to a
remainder are strong evidence of an intention that the remainder is
to vest on the death of the testator.10 Thus, in the instant case, the
court was not only aided by the general rule that the survivorship intended is that of the testator, but also by the fact that the gifts to the
grandchildren were made expressly subject to the survival of the testator, so that in the absence of language referring to the gifts to the
sons which clearly indicated that the period meant was the life ten6 Under a will directing an equal division of his estate--devised in trust for
the testator's wife-among his children on her death or remarriage, the remainder vested in the children at the testator's death, there being no contingency as
to persons entitled to the remainder, or event on which it was limited. In re
Baumiller's Estate, 155 Misc. 815, 280 N. Y. Supp. 537 (1935). See also Matter
of Accounts of Mahan, 98 N. Y. 372 (1885); Matter of Johnson, 212 App.
Div. 768, 210 N. Y. Supp. 33 (3d Dept. 1925) ; Matter of White, 213 App. Div.
82, 209 N. Y. Supp. 433 (1st Dept. 1925); Matter of Walsh's Estate, 147 Misc.
103, 264 N. Y. Supp. 621 (1933).
7 A bequest to one for life with remainder over to certain named legatees
passes a vested interest to the remainderman in the absence of a contrary testamentary intention, and the interest of the remainderman who dies before the
life tenant passes to his successors in interest. Matter of Lockwood, 192 App.
N. Y. Supp. 103 (3d Dept. 1920); Matter of Clarke, 120 Misc.
Div. 850, 183
191, 197 I . Y. Supp. 824 (1923). See note 3, supra.
8 The presumption against intestacy is very strong and is applied in all
cases. West v. West, 215 App. Div. 285, 213 N. Y. Supp. 480 (2d Dept. 1926).
See also In re Niles' Will, 164 Misc. 328, 298 N. Y. Supp. 727 (1937); In re
Valentine's Estate, 165 Misc. 863, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 695 (1937); In re Kearney's
Estate, 169 Misc. 947, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 290 (1939) ; In re Rathbone's Estate,
170 Misc. 1030, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 506 (1939).
9 Where testator bequeathed residuary estate to trustees for the use of his
wife during her life, and upon her death the residuary estate was to be equally
distributed among naamed legatees, the gift vested on the death of the testator,
since a gift of remainder to named persons in existence at the death of the
testator imports an immediate vesting. In re Chaim's Estate, 168 Misc. 923,
6 N. Y. S. (2d) 713 (1938). See also Matter of Brundrett, 135 Misc. 574,
240 N. Y. Supp. 220 (1929); In re Murphy's Estate, 157 Misc. 5, 283 N. Y.
Supp. 545 (1935); In re Dudley's Will, 168 Misc. 695, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 489
(1938) ; In re Merriam's Estate, 168 Misc. 932, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 692 (1938).
20 Where a remainder is created by words of present gift and the only
contingency is a death certain to occur and the remaindermen are known and
fixed, the postponing clause is to be regarded as relating only to the period of
actual enjoyment and not to the period of vesting of the interest. Matter of
Gurnee, 84 Misc. 324, 147 N. Y. Supp. 396 (1914). See also In re Robinson's
Will, 155 Misc. 412, 281 N. Y. Supp. 625 (1935) (Primary rules to be followed
by the court in determining the question of future estates are testator's intention, reasonable interpretation to avoid intestacy, early vesting of title and
preference to heirs of blood to strangers) ; In re Evans' Estate, 165 Misc. 752,
1 N. Y. S. (2d) 99 (1937).
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ant's life, it was reasonable to presume that the period of survival
was to be the same, namely, the testator's life."
However, "the general rule, that the death referred to in the
will is death in the lifetime of the testator, yields to facts or circumstances or language in the will indicating a different intention." 12
This is in accordance with the established rule that all canons of testamentary construction give way to an expressed testamentary intent
to the contrary. 13 Thus, where there is a direction in a will to convert realty into personalty upon the death of the life tenant and divide
the proceeds, with the remainder of the personalty, among the then
living heirs of testator and his deceased wife, there is an intention' to
postpone the date of vesting until the time of payment.' 4 Similarly,
in a will where there are no words of a present gift, ahcd the gift is
to be found only in the direction to divide or pay. over it a future tifhe
-so that futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift-it is said
to.be a contingent gift which will not vest in the remainderman -until
the time for payment arrives. 15 In the absence, however, of. an unequivocal expression by the -testator clearly. indicating the time at
which the estate is to vest, it -will be deemed to' vest as of the death
of the testator.
R. jM.

1"Concurring opinion of Lazansky, ., instant case at 731. -The court also
found that "if the. pertinent language here were construed, as requiring the
irmaindermen to survive the life tenant,. intestacy would- result if. the life tenant
survived the other two -sons of an- earlier marriage,: who are well advanced in
years.
The designation of the three sons by name -iq an effective element
in the determination of the intent of -the testator that the remainder should .vest
in the2 sons on their survival of the testator.
1 In re Evans' Estate, 165 Misc. 752, 763, 1 N. Y. S.- (2d) 99, 109 (1937).
'3 Whitwell v. Whitwell, '146 App. 'Div. 270, .130 N. Y. Supp. 906 (4th
Dept. 1911) ; In re Atkinson's Will, 120 Misc. 186, 197 N. Y. Supp. 831 (1923) ;
In re Matthew's Estate, 154 Misc, 779, 278 N. Y. Supp. 904 (1935); In re
Wilkins' Will, 155 Misc. 152, 278 N. Y. Supp. 891 (1935)..
:14In re Potter's Estate, 167 Misc. 848, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 828 -(1938), aft'd,
255 App. Div. 823,- 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 32 (4th Dept.' 1938).
15 In re Bennett's Estate, 156 Misc. 694, 282 N. Y. Supp. 645 (1935). As
to the application of the."Divide and Pay Over Rule", wherein there is a .gift
found only in a testamentary direction to divide or.pay over at a future time,
and in which the gift is said not to vest in the remainderman until the time for
payment arrives, see In re Cipolla, 165 Misc. 498, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 8 (1938) ;
In re Watson's Will, 164 Misc. 940, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1126 (1938) ; In re Grube's
Will, 169 Misc. 170, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 794 (1938).

